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HARRY KALVEN, JR.

THE CONCEPT OF THE PUBLIC
FORUM: COX v. LOUISIANA

"How come you're not saying we any more?"
From cartoon of prizefighter who has
just been knocked out and is being
carried toward the dressing room. He
is addressing his manager walking beside him.

I. THEmE
It is familiar knowledge that, during the decades of the thirties and forties, the Jehovah's Witnesses, a sect "distinguished by
great religious zeal and astonishing powers of annoyance,"' brought
to the Supreme Court of the United States a large and varied number of issues about the exercise of freedom of speech and religion in

public places. 2 Indeed, in their robust evangelism, they appear to
have stimulated the expression by the Court of a full chapter of constitutional law. Perhaps in no other corner of First Amendment
theory have we had so ready a supply of relevant precedents.3
Harry Kalven, Jr., is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1
CHAFEE, FREE S ,mcn i THE UNITED STATES 399 (1948). A vivid description of
their tactics isgiven in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in Douglas v. Jeannette,
319 U.S.157, 166-74 (1943).
2 There are more than 30 cases in all beginning with Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938), the large majority of which involve Witnesses.
a The cases are conveniently collected and discussed in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-89 (1951); see
also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YArx L.J.
877, 926-28, 946-47 (1963).
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Despite an occasional celebrated overnight shift in doctrine, as between Jones v. Opelika4 and Murdock v. Pennsylvania5 or, again,
between Saiav. New York6 and Kovacs v. Cooper,7 and a frequently
brilliant angry dissent from Mr. Justice Jackson,8 the Court seemed
to have the matter well in hand and to have an agreed framework for
handling it. As the Communist issues came to the fore in the fifties,
the problem receded and the story of the streets became a bit quaint.
We were likely to regard the law that had been developed as one
that concerned a luxury civil liberty. It was a sign of how tolerant
toward a sharply dissident minority our society could be, if the
minority was small and eccentric.
It appears now that the story is not over. A year or two ago, the
guess would have been that the Negro protest would raise its most
interesting legal issue over the use of private property.9 But the civil
rights legislation has largely put to rest the problem of the sit-in, 10

and there is every indication that the civil rights movement is going
back onto the streets. While prediction in these matters is always
imprudent," it appears that the Court's formidable business in the
immediate future will require it to confront the issues raised by
today's Negro "evangelism."
The Court has had two major encounters with problems raised by
Negro protest in public places. In 1963 it decided Edwards v.
South Carolina2 and last Term it added Cox v. Louisiana.13 The
4 316 U.S. 584 (1942), judgment vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
7 336 US. 77 (1949).
6 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
5 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
8 See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 166 (1943); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 566 (1948); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949); Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951).

9 See Harlan, J., concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 US. 157, 185 (1961);
KALvN, THE NGRO AND Tm Fmsr AmENDzmENr 123-72 (1965).
1o See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
"1 Cf. David Riesman's brilliant but erroneous prediction about the coming
problem of a Fascist exploitation of the American law of defamation. Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation, 42 COLUM. L. Ray. 727, 1085, 1282 (1942).
12 372 U.S. 229 (1963). In the interval between Edwards and Cox the Court
decided two other Negro protest cases, albeit in a cryptic form. Fields v. South
Carolina, 375 US. 44 (1963); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 US. 776 (1964).
The Fields litigation was first reviewed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1962 when, in State v. Brown, 240 S.C. 357, it affirmed a series of convictions for breach of peace. It appears that some 1,000 Negro students in three
groups paraded two abreast along the sidewalks in the business section of a town
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frustrating variety of opinions within the Court in Cox, and the
sharp contrast in tone between the opinions in Edwards and those in
Cox, make of Cox an appropriate occasion for venturing some reflections about the problems of speech in public places, an occasion
for re-examining the concept of the public forum implicit in the
earlier cases. The Court having just a year ago, in the New York
Times case,'14 underwritten the policy that speech on public issues be
"uninhibited, robust and wide open" may find its exuberant formula
put to hard tests when the speech is in public places. 15
of 20,000, ostensibly on their way to the city square. They refused to disband at
request of police and were arrested. The state court held that the background of
"high tension between the races in the community" justified a breach-of-peace
conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the state court judgment and remanded for consideration in light of Edwards. 372 U.S. 522 (1963).
The state court on remand reaffirmed in a per curiam opinion. 242 S.C. 357 (1963).
Finally, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam order citing Edwards, reversed. 375
U.S. 44 (1963).
Henry had much the same career: the state court again relied on community
tension to support convictions for breach of peace. 241 S.C. 427 (1962). It, too,
was remanded for consideration in light of Edwards. 375 U.S. 6 (1963). In a full
opinion expressing bewilderment that the Court in Edwards could have meant
"to hold that one has an absolute right to commit a breach of peace, provided
one is engaged at the time in the exercise of a right protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution," the South Carolina court reaffirmed its
earlier judgment. 244 S.C. 74, 78 (1963). The Supreme Court reversed in a twopage per curiam opinion. 376 U.S. 776 (1964).
Finally, at the end of last Term, the Court vacated the judgment in Cameron v.
Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), and remanded it to the District Court for reconsideration in light of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479 (1965). The case involved a
suit by civil rights demonstrators to enjoin enforcement of a Mississippi antipicketing statute. The Supreme Court did not pass on the merits but only on the
procedural question whether there was a basis for federal jurisdiction. There is a
sharp and interesting dissent by Mr. Justice Black. See note 89 infra.
13 379 U.S. 536, 559 (1965).
14 Sullivan v. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Kalven, The New York
Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," [1964]
SUPREAxI COURT RZv-w 191.
151 am, perhaps somewhat cavalierly, putting the complex story of the labor
picketing cases to one side. What is involved in the cases I am discussing is what
might be called "public issue" picketing, there is no picket line, there is no specific
target, there need be no evoking of economic pressures. I go with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's judgment in Niemotko that the picketing cases, although "logically
relevant" are set apart by the different "economic and social interests" they involve.
340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951). Further, since there is no argument here that speech in
public places is beyond the reach of any regulation, it is not clear what the picketing cases would add. In brief the thesis does not, as I see it, rise or fall with the
vicissitudes of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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II. PREFACE:

EDWARDS AND Cox

The flavor of these cases depends so much on nuances in the
facts that there is no tidy way to compare them. Each involved mass
parade, picketing, and protest in a public place by Negro students.
In each a sizable crowd of white onlookers gathered and there was
some suggestion that the crowd was restive. In each the performance was closely watched by police, who were out in force. In each
the legal crisis arose when the police, after many minutes of surveillance, finally decided to move in and order the groups to disband.
There are, to be sure, important differences in the location and
nature of the public place selected for the demonstrations, in the
legal grounds urged against them, and possibly in the fact that in
Edwards all 179 of the demonstrators were arrested whereas in Cox
only the leader was subjected to legal proceedings. 16 But before
turning to the relevance of such points of difference, it will be helpful to establish the style of the two protests, a style it seems to me
they shared.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, set the stage in
7

Edwards:

Late in the morning of March 2, 1961, the petitioners,
high school and college students of the Negro race, met at
the Zion Baptist Church in Columbia. From there at about
noon they walked in separate groups of about 15 to the South
Carolina State House grounds, an area of tvo city blocks
open to the general public. Their purpose was to "submit a
protest to the citizens of South Carolina, along with the
Legislative Bodies of South Carolina, our feelings and our
dissatisfaction with present conditions of discriminatory actions against Negroes, in general, and to let them know we
were dissatisfied and that we would like for the laws which
prohibited Negro privileges in this State to be removed."
Already on the State House grounds when petitioners
arrived, were some 30 or more law enforcement officers who
had advance knowledge that petitioners were coming. Each
group of petitioners entered the grounds through a driveway
and parking area known in the record as the "horseshoe."
16 Cox was sentenced to four months in jail and a $200 fine for disturbing the
peace; to five months in jail and a $500 fine for obstructing public passages; and to
$5,000 fine and one year in jail for picketing the courthouse. The sentences were
cumulative.
17 372 US. at 230-31.
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As they entered they were told by the law enforcement officials that they had a right as a citizen to go through the State
House grounds as any other citizen has, as long as they were
peaceful. During the next half hour or 45 minutes, the petitioners in the same small groups walked single file or two
abreast in an orderly way through the grounds, each group
carrying placards bearing such messages as "I am proud to be
a Negro" and "Down with segregation."
And here is Mr. Justice Goldberg describing the scene for the
majority in Cox:' 8
On December 14, 1961, 23 students from Southern University, a Negro college, were arrested in downtown Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, for picketing stores that maintained segregated lunch counters ....
[After a mass meeting on campus
that night,] the students resolved to demonstrate the next day
in front of the courthouse in protest of segregation and the
arrest and imprisonment of the picketers who were being held
in the parish jail located on the upper floor of the courthouse
building.
[Next day the students left the campus in mass and marched
five miles to Baton Rouge. The student leader having been
arrested for violation of an anti-noise statute while using a
sound truck, the defendant Cox, a Congregational minister,
field secretary of CORE, and adviser to the student movement,
came to "pick up this leadership and keep things orderly."]
When Cox arrived 1,500 of the 2,000 students were assembling at the site of the old State Capitol building two and
one half blocks from the courthouse. Cox walked up and
down cautioning the students to keep to one side of the sidewalk while getting ready for their march to the courthouse.
The students circled the block in a file two or three abreast
occupying about one-half the sidewalk.... They walked in
an orderly and peaceful file, two or three abreast, one block
east, stopping on the way for a red traffic light....
[The students were joined by another group and came to
a halt in the next block opposite the courthouse. A colloquy
with police officials followed.' 9 ] The students were then directed by Cox to the west sidewalk across from the courthouse, 101 feet from its steps. They were lined up on this
sidewalk about five deep and spread almost the entire length
of the block. The group did not obstruct the street. [Several
18 379 U.S. at 538-43.
19 It is this colloquy that turns out to be decisive for Mr. Justice Goldberg's disposition of the convictions for picketing near the courthouse. See note 33 infra.

6

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

hundred onlookers gathered on the sidewalk near the courthouse and some 75 to 80 police and members of the fire department also turned out.]
Several of the students took from beneath their coats picket
signs similar to those which had been used the day before.
The signs bore legends such as "Don't buy discrimination for
Christmas," "Sacrifice for Christ, don't buy," and named stores
which were proclaimed "unfair." They then sang "God
Bless America," pledged allegiance to the flag, prayed briefly,
and sang one or two hymns, including "We Shall Overcome." The 23 students who were locked in jail cells in the
courthouse building out of the sight of the demonstrators
responded by themselves singing; this, in turn, was greeted
with cheers and applause by the demonstrators.
[Cox then made a speech uging them to sit in at the downtown lunch counters that had refused to serve Negroes but
admonished them against violence. 20 At this juncture the
police moved in and the protest group was disbanded.]
The style of the protest, as I said, seems to me essentially the same
in both cases, and the style is worth noting. These are structured
ceremonials of protest; they are not riots. The demonstrators were
not, as the majority recited the record, 21 trying to bring government
to a halt; rather they were expressing the concern of the young
Negro about his situation. What was symbolized was a deep grievance, a break with the society. They prayed, they pledged allegiance
to the flag, they sang "God Bless America," and-in Cox-they even
stopped for a red traffic light. Whatever the power, pressure, and
anxiety generated by such huge numbers, the demonstrations
showed a tact, a grace, a patience, and a distinctive rhetoric of their
own.
I I"- ,! 4
The tone of the two opinions, on the other hand, is very different.
The memorable thing about Edwards was that Mr. Justice Stewart,
20 For the chief of police this speech was the critical, unlawful act and moved
him to intervene and disband the meeting. The issue raised by this advocacy of
sit-in demonstrations dropped out of the case, however, thus eliminating a difficult free-speech issue. On what would the legality of advocating sit-ins depend?
Clear and present danger of sit-ins? Legality of the sit-ins? Cf. Hall, Free Speecb in
War Times, 21 CoLUM. L. RrEv. 526, 531 (1921).
21 Mr. Justice Clark in dissent read the record less sympathetically: "The appellant in an effort to influence and intimidate the courts and legal officials of Baton
Rouge... agitated and led a mob of over 2,000 students in the staging of a modern
Donnybrook Fair across from the courthouse... " 379 U.S. at 585. Mr. Justice
Goldberg reviewed the record in some detail in notes 9, 10, and 12 of his opinion.
Id. at 546-48.
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speaking for everyone but Mr. Justice Clark, said of the defendants
and of their "rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to
petition for redress of their grievances" :22 "The circumstances of
this case reflect an exercise of these basic constitutionalrights in their
most pristine and classic form."
At one point in Cox, Mr. Justice Goldberg spoke of the "influence
or domination by either a hostile or friendly mob" 23 and again "mob
law is the very antithesis of due process. ' 24 Further, in a curious
echo of the idiom of Edwards,he wrote that the Court was not dealing here with speech "in its pristine form but with conduct of a
totally different character." 2 And Mr. Justice Black found it relevant to say: 2 "Those who encourage minority groups to believe
that the United States Constitution and federal laws give them a
right to patrol and picket in the streets whenever they choose, in
order to advance what they think to be a just and noble end, do no
service to those minority groups, their cause, or their country."
As a logical matter the decisions in Cox and Edwards are fully
consistent. In Edwards the single charge was for breach of the
peace, and the Court upset the convictions, emphasizing among
other things the absence of a precisely drawn statutory offense. In
Cox one of the charges was for breach of the peace, and again the
convictions were upset, with the Court relying heavily on Edwards
as precedent. Further, although the Court in Cox split on other
issues, all nine Justices agreed that the convictions for breach of the
peace could not stand.
There was more to Cox than a generalized breach-of-peace
charge, however, and the additional charges suggest obvious differences between it and Edwards. There were two specific statutory
violations, one for obstructing a public passageway 28 and the other
22372 U.S. at 235. (Emphasis added.)
23

379 U.S. at 562.

24 Id. at 562.
2

25 Id. at 566.
26

ld. at 584.

7 Mr. Justice Clark, however, would invalidate the breach of peace convictions

only on equal protection grounds. Id. at 591.
28" No person shall wilfully obstruct the free, convenient and normal use of any
public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or other passageway, or the
entrance, corridor or passage of any public building, structure, watercraft or ferry,
by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage thereon
or therein.
"Providing however nothing herein contained shall apply to a bona fide legiti-
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for picketing near a courthouse. 29 Although in the end the Court

also upset the convictions under these two heads, the opinions, as I
have said, bristled with cautions and with a lack of sympathy for
such forms of protest.
The obstruction charge, which might have forced a fruitful clarification of the law on the public forum, was handled so as to satisfy
no one. The Justices split 7 to 2, with Justices White and Harlan
voting to uphold the convictions. Further, the seven-man majority
in turn split 5 to 2, with Justices Black and Clark finding the statute
bad only because it exempted labor picketing and thus, on their
view, ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Justices Black and
Clark, however, were insistent on making clear their view that a flat
nondiscriminatory prohibition of all such activity would be constitutional. The remaining Justices, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Goldberg, faced neither the equal protection issue nor the issue of
flat prohibition. Instead they found some evidence that in practice
the obstruction-of-public-way statute was administered by an informal permit or licensing arrangement.30 Because this informal dismate labor organization or to any of its legal activities such as picketing, lawful
assembly or concerted activity in the interest of its members for the purpose of
accomplishing or securing more favorable wage standards, hours of employment
and working conditions...." LA.Rv.STAT. § 14:100.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
29 "Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the
administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness,
or court officer, in the discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana, or in or near a building or residence
occupied or used by such judge, juror, witness, or court officer, or with such intent
uses any sound-truck or similar device or resorts to any other demonstration in or
near any such building or residence, shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both... "'LA. REv.STAT. § 14:101
(Cum.Supp. 1962).
30 The step was made rapidly. Mr. Justice Goldberg asserted, without citation to
the record, that "city officials ... clearly indicated that meetings and parades...
obstructing traffic 'are permitted' provided prior approval is obtained." He then
simply added that counsel for the state confirmed this in oral argument before the
Court. 379 U.S. at 555-56. The record on this point was reviewed more explicitly
by Mr. Justice White's dissent: "The sole indication in the record from the state
court that such has occurred was contained in the testimony of the Chief of Police who, in the process of pointing out that Cox and his group had not announced
the fact or purpose of their meeting, said 'most organizations that want to hold a
parade or a meeting of any kind ...have no reluctance to evidence their desires at
the start.'
".... At the oral argument in response to Mr. Justice Goldberg's question as to
whether parades and demonstrations are allowed in Baton Rouge, counsel said, 'ar-
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cretion of the licensing official was not properly delineated and
bounded, the statute was found bad. The use of this stratagem suggests that there may have been more than four Justices who would
have found a flat prohibition valid. But the issue is deliberately left
muddied.
The Justices divided 5 to 4 on the issue of courthouse picketing,
with Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, and White dissenting. This time
the majority, again speaking through Mr. Justice Goldberg,3 used a
different stratagem32 to upset the convictions. In a colloquy between
Cox and the police chief at the time of the demonstration, Cox was
allegedly told by the chief that it was all right for the demonstrators
to stay on the side of the street opposite the courthouse. To the
exasperation of the dissent this was elevated into an official construcdon of the word "near" in the statute so as to estop the state from
prosecuting.33 This time, however, the majority too was explicit that
the statute is constitutional.
Two relevant factors emerge then from Cox, read against the
background of Edwards. First, there is the extraordinary ambivalence of the Court's reaction. As the parade leaves the State House
grounds and moves down toward the courthouse, it changes .from
an attractive group of concerned citizens using democratic avenues
of protest on public issues to a mob, heavy with the promise of
anarchy, seeking to dominate. Second, despite the awkward split of
opinions in Cox, a certain scheme of legal results can be discerned:
(1) At one extreme, it is clear that this kind of use of public streets
rangements are usually made depending on the size of the demonstration, of course,
arrangements are made with the officials and their cooperation is not only required
it is needed where you have such a large crowd: " Id. at 591-92.
Mr. Justice White also complained that this was an issue of the Court's "own
invention" and consequently one on which the parties had no chance to "develop
or refute the factual basis underlying the Court's rationale:'
3. There were two separate appeals: No. 24, involving breach of peace and obstructing, reported at 379 U.S. 536 (1965); and No. 49 involving picketing the
courthouse, reported at 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
32 It is true that the case is complicated by the difference between the police
image of what was illegal in Cox's conduct and the issues on which he was finally
convicted. See note 20 supra.
33 Mr. Justice Clark was moved to an unusually acid dissent: "However, if the
Chief's action be consent, I never knew until today that a law enforcement official
-city, state or national-could forgive a breach of the criminal laws. I missed that
in my law school, in my practice and for the two years I was head of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice." 379 U.S. at 588-89.
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and places cannot be summarily suppressed as a breach of the peace,
even though there is some expectation of violence.34 (2) At the
other extreme is the unequivocal clarity of the point that no matter
who you are or what your grievance, you cannot picket the courthouse. (3) In the middle, so to speak, is the question of obstructing
public passageways, a question that the full Court colored with dicta
but studiously avoided deciding, although it is the question on which
future use of public places by protest groups will in all probability
turn.
To bring matters to a focus as sharply as possible, I would note
that there are references in the stated facts in Edwards to some
blocking of traffic, at least in the sense of forcing other pedestrians
off the sidewalks and into the streets, although the majority and the
dissent read the record somewhat differently on this point."s In Cox
the statute made it an offense to block traffic, even when that was
not the intention. What is left in doubt after Cox is whether the
exercise of rights "in their pristine and classic form," as in Edwards,
would nevertheless have been punishable as a crime had the state
proceeded under an obstruction statute like that of Louisiana.
I turn now to some reflections about this category of speech
problem, reflections that claim no more than to invoke a slightly
different way of looking at familiar issues.
III. TOWARD A THEORY OF THE PUBLIc FORUM
It may prove helpful to risk the pretentiousness of distinguishing among three closely related gestures of protest often
lumped together in popular discussions of the civil rights movement:
revolution, civil disobedience, and protest. A revolutionary gesture
34
Like Edwards, the Cox case touches on the perplexing speech issue of "the
heckler's veto:' To what extent is the violent reaction expected from the audience
a basis for suppressing the speaker? See KALvN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 140-41,
145; Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 COLuM. L. Ray. 1118 (1949); Note, Free Speech and the Hostile Audience,

26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 489 (1951).

The Louisiana Supreme Court had held that the bringing of the 1,500 Negroes
into the "predominantly white business district" was so explosive a move that it
"had to be an inherent breach of the peace." The Court, however, found that in
fact the police had the situation under control and thus did not find it necessary to
confront the full dilemma. See also the Fields and Henry cases, note 12 supra.
35 Compare Mr. Justice Stewar's opinion, 372 US. at 232 n. 5, 6, with Mr. Justice Clark's opinion, id. at 240 n. 3.
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is intended as direct defiance of law and order; it is a declaration of
open war; it is coercive and obstructive. It may well be morally justifiable, but only under the stringent conditions by which Western
tradition has measured a right of revolution. The suggestion, for
example, that Negroes let their water taps run in New York to
aggravate the water shortage is just such a revolutionary gesture.
Civil disobedience is deliberate violation of law for the sake of
protest and as a matter of individual conscience. It is a gesture we
associate with Socrates, Thoreau, and conscientious objectors. In the
famous formula of Plato's Apology and Crito this gesture requires
that the actor accept the punishment. 36 It is a refusal to obey the law
coupled with a willingness to accept the legal consequences. Insofar
as it is symbolic, it is also an intense form of protest. To an uncertain
extent, especially in the sit-in demonstrations, the Negro movement
has in this sense courted arrest.37 The important point is that civil
disobedience claims exemption from the obligation to obey particular laws on moral grounds but not immunity from punishment.
Finally, there are the various forms of mass protest in public places
using parades, picketing, and so on. Here the essential feature is
appeal to public opinion. 38 The intention is not to violate the law,
and the claim is one of privilege in the exercise of basic rights. Most
of the civil rights demonstrations to date, as I see it, fall in this category. This has been one of the extraordinary achievements of the
movement. It is this gesture of protest that I am concerned with in
this essay. These distinctions are undoubtedly difficult to draw from
the facts, and the Negro movement has not itself always been clear
about which strategy it was pursuing. The Negro movement shares
with the rest of us the task of working out the appropriate forms for
its protest.
It is simplistic, if tempting, to reduce the issue to a choice between
order and anarchy. I suggest three interrelated propositions for
examination. First, that in an open democratic society the streets, the
30 The tension between the two dialogues is lucidly explored in MxEuiaxjoHN,
PouLncAL FRaaom 21-24 (1960).
37 In Botie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), for example, the dissent
argued that the defendants in their sit-in could not have been misled by any ambiguity in the trespass statute because they "intended" to be arrested. Id. at 367 n. 4.
38 Thus, in his opinion in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201-02 (1961), Mr.
Justice Harlan eloquently recognized this aspect of the sit-in. See KI rAv,op. cit.
supra note 9, at 129-33.
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parks, and other public places are an important facility for public
discussion and political process. They are in brief a public forum
that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with
which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.
Second, that only confusion can result from distinguishing sharply
between "speech pure" and "speech plus." And, third, that what is
required is in effect a set of Robert's Rules of Order for the new
uses of the public forum, albeit the designing of such rules poses a
problem of formidable practical difficulty. As will be apparent,
there is much in Cox that bears on these three points. The Court in
strong dicta seems to becloud the first; to rely heavily on the distinction that is denied by the second; and to avoid examining the
problem in quite the manner suggested by the third.
I shall pursue my inquiry by recalling two famous dicta, and then
revisiting a familiar series of precedents.
A. THE PRINCIPLE AND TWO DICTA

The initial questions are whether the citizen using the street as a
forum and not as a passageway is making an anomalous use of it, and
whether he is, in a sense, always out of place and out of order when
he chooses the streets for his meeting place. Certainly it is easy to
think of public places, swimming pools, for example, so clearly dedicated to recreational use that talk of their use as a public forum
would in general be totally unpersuasive. Is the street, however, a
kind of public hall, a public communication facility?
One would have thought the theoretical issue had been put to rest
30
a generation ago by the collision of dicta in Davis v. Massachusetts
4
°
and Hague v. C.I.O. DazVs, it will be recalled, was one of the less
admired efforts of Justice Holmes, then still on the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.4 In reviewing a conviction for speaking on
the Boston Common without a permit, in violation of an ordinance
inhibiting many varieties of uses of the Common including "the discharge of cannon" thereon, Justice Holmes observed: 42 "For the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in
a highway or public park is no more an infringement of rights of
a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to
forbid it in the house."
39 167 U.S. 43 (1897).

4

40 307 U.S. 496 (1939).

4

1162 Mass. 510 (1895).

2 Id.at 511.
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When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
Court endorsed the Holmes decision and its rationale. Said Chief
Justice White: 43 "The right to absolutely exclude all right to use,
necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the
lesser." This position has at least the virtue of clarity. The citizen
uses the streets for political purposes at the sufferance of the state;
his use is anomalous and marginal and can be terminated whenever
and for whatever reason the state decides.
This view survived until 1937 when Mayor Hague of Jersey City
got into an argument, not with Jehovah's Witnesses, but with the
CIO, then seeking energetically to organize New Jersey labor." In
a complicated lawsuit, the Court passed on the city's claim that its
ordinance requiring a permit for an open air meeting was justified
by the plenary power rationale of the Davis case. In rejecting the
45
point, Mr. Justice Roberts uttered the counter dictum:
Wherever the title of street and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
On this view the matter is perhaps not quite so clear, but there is
the aura of a large democratic principle. When the citizen goes to
the street, he is exercising an immemorial right of a free man, a kind
of First-Amendment easement. If so generous a statement of principle does not tell us exactly when his privileges may be curtailed in
the interest of other speech or other uses of the street, it does give us
a good starting point for the argument.
Perhaps two details about the Hague dictum deserve notice. First,
it is not altogether clear for whom Mr. Justice Roberts was speaking, as the Court was reminded in 1947 in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Saia.46 On one view of the case he was speaking only for himself and Mr. Justice Black, who joined his opinion, and inferentially
43

167 U.S. at 48.

44The background of the case is sketched in CHAFx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 409
et seq.
45307 U.S. at 515.
46 334 U.S. at 568 n. 1.
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for Chief Justice HIhghes, who concurred in part.47 This is probably

too stringent a reading, but it is true that the Roberts dictum,
despite its eloquence, is launched with a shaky endorsement from his
fellow Justices.
The second detail is that the Court was aided, and obviously
made use of a major amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights
Committee of the American Bar Association, among whose members were Zechariah Chafee and Grenville Clark.48 The brief said
in part: 49 "There are many different kinds of benefits to be derived

from parks, and one of the most important is the constitutional right
of assembly therein. The parks are held by the city subject to this
right."
It is not so easy as it should be to tell how the Roberts dictum
fares today. It is not enshrined as the starting point for judicial analysis in cases of speech in public places, although it is true that in
Kunz 0 Chief Justice Vinson did announce: "In considering the
right of a municipality to control the use of public streets for the
expression of religious views, we start with the words of Mr. Justice
Roberts...22
There are subtle but definite transformations of it in two prestigeful opinions, that of Mr. Justice Black in Jamison v. Texas81 in 1943,
and that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion in Niemotko 2 in
53
1951. In Jamison, a leaflet distribution case, Mr. Justice Black said:
"But one who is rightfully on a street... carries with him there as
elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly
fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by spoken word." Somehow this strikes
right of
my ear as a good deal less enthusiastic about the immemorial
54
the free man than does the text of Mr. Justice Roberts.

47 Justices Frankfurter and Douglas did not participate; Justices McReynolds and
Butler dissented; Mr. Justice Stone filed a concurring opinion objecting to Mr.
Justice Roberts' reliance on the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the basis for
federal injunctive relief against enforcement of state law. For a rundown of the
various positions, see CHAs-EE op. cit. supra note 1, at 413 n. 77.
48
Parts of the brief are reprinted in 307 U.S. at 678-82. And see the extended
discussion of it in CHI-a"_, op. cit. supra note 1, at 413-35.
49 307 U.S. at 682.
50 340 U.S. at 293.

52 340 US. at 273-89.

6a 318 U.S. at 416.
6 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
54 Mr.Justice Black continued to phrase the principle this way in Cox: "The
First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and
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In Niemotko, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made an elaborate summary of all the public-place cases up to that time and a major effort
to bring order to them. He was careful to state the issue as one of
"how to reconcile the interest in allowing free expression in public
places with the protection of ... the primary uses of streets and
parks." 5 If this is the correct phrasing of the issue,56 it is difficult to
see why the primary uses of the streets and parks should not always
and easily outweigh the subordinate uses as public forums, again a
result not easy to square with the Roberts dictum. Moreover, in
summarizing the Hague case itself, Mr. Justice Frankfurter carefully
abstained from referring to the Roberts formula and asserted the
holding to be simply that the state cannot claim totally arbitrary
control over its public places. 57
It is probably not profitable to brood further over the verbal differences among Roberts' immemorial claim of the free man, Black's
notion that he does not lose any rights of free speech simply by
going out on the street, and Frankfurter's formula that the state cannot be arbitrary in its control of the streets. Since Mr. Justice
Roberts was quick to say in Hague that these immemorial rights
were subject to reasonable regulation in view of other demands for
the streets and public places,15 it is arguable that all three formulations, however different in emotional tone and color, will lead to the
same operative results in any actual case.
B. THE TEST QUESTION AND FOUR DECISIONS

The test question is whether the state can bar the use of public
places for speech altogether, not on a claim of plenary power as in
Davis, but in the interest of other uses of the facility. This may well
prove to be tomorrow's issue, since municipalities burdened with the
perplexities of regulating the current protests may be greatly
tempted to opt for flat nondiscriminatory prohibition on the use of
streets and parks for anything but transportation and recreation.
federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people
have a right to be for such purposes." 379 U.S. at 578. (Emphasis added.) Thus, in
an important sense, for him the questions of speech are subordinate to questions of
property. See his dissent in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964); KALvEN,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 170-72.
GG340 U.S. at 276; see also his rephrasing id. at 279.
It is true that this is very close to some of the language of Mr. Justice Roberts
GO
in Schneider.See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
68 See note 56 supra.
57 340 U.S. at 279.
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In four cases, all involving leaflet distribution, Schneider,Jamison,
Valentine, and Talley, the Court has given impressive content to the
Roberts dictum.
In Schneider, Mr. Justice Roberts got the first chance to put his
own dictum into operation.59 The case combined four separate controversies over municipal ordinances, three of which are relevant for
our immediate purposes. 6 Each invoked a flat prohibition against
the distribution of handbills, circulars, dodgers, etc., in public places.
The defendants, Jehovah's Witnesses, were convicted for violation
of the ordinances, and in an 8 to 1 decision, Mr. Justice McReynolds
dissenting, the Court upset the convictions. What is important
here is that the state did not argue its plenary power but argued
rather that the purpose of the restraint was to prevent littering the
streets. There was, therefore, no need to go back to Davis.
At the outset Mr. Justice Roberts made clear that although
"pamphlets had become historic weapons in the defense of liberty,"
the right to distribute leaflets was subject to certain obvious regulations:6 1 "For example, a person could not exercise this liberty by
taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street contrary to traffic
regulations and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic."
What was called for was a balancing of the conflicting interests,
but with a weight of enthusiasm for the personal rights involved.
"This court," Mr. Justice Roberts paused to note,62 "has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one and was
63
not lightly used." He continued:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of
the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine
the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative
59 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). He did not get to use it directly in
Hague itself because that case turned on the invalidity of a prior licensing ordinance.
60 The fourth ordinance involved prior licensing of solicitations.
62 Id. at 161.
61 308 U.S. at 160.
63 The phrasing of how the balance is to be struck is in the idiom of "preferred
position"; hence it might be argued that the case is no longer fashionable. But
whatever the vicissitudes of the preferred position controversy or its relevance for
other speech issues, it seems quite clear that Schneider is a live precedent for the
Court today and is frequently cited with respect.
It is evident, however, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have erased this emphasis from the Schneider formula; witness his concurring opinions in Niernotko,
340 U.S. at 273, and Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89. See note 76 infra.
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preference or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as the cases arise, the delicate and
difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances
and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
He then moved swiftly and surely to the evaluation of the con64
tested ordinances:
We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the streets
clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an
ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public
street from handing literature to one willing to receive
it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning
and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such
distribution results from the constitutional protection of the
freedom of speech and press.
The Milwaukee ordinance could not be saved by the argument
that in actual practice prosecutions under it were limited to cases
where the recipients throw it into the streets. The answer was still
that "public convenience in respect to cleanliness of the streets" did
not justify an interference with free communication. Nor could the
Los Angeles and Worcester ordinances be saved by the circumstance that they were limited to streets and alleys, leaving other public places open. Here the point was met in language with echoes
from the Hague dictum: 6 "[Als we have said, the streets are natural
and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion;
64308 U.S. at 162. Mr. Justice Roberts went on to suggest that the city had alternative ways of achieving its objective such as arresting the recipient who tossed
the leaflets on the street. The case thus might be read as simply upsetting a gratuitously broad regulation. Cf., e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). It is difficult to take seriously so impractical an alternative. Moreover, at most this ground
points to what is in Mr. Justice Roberts' eyes an additional vice in the regulation
and not its decisive flaw. Cf., e.g., Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reading of Schneider in
his Niemotko summary, 340 U.S. at 276.
65 Id. at 163. Does this mean that a city could not solve its problems by setting
aside special areas for protests and demonstrations and closing its streets and parks
to them otherwise? The American Bar Association committee in its brief in Hague
considered explicitly the setting-up of "Hyde Parks." See CHAtrra, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 418-19. Ironically, one difficulty with the Hyde Park solution may be
that it does not afford an adequate opportunity to secure an audience, see note 88
infra.
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and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."
The result, whether or not one likes it as a policy, had an impressive bite.6 6 Leaflet distribution in public places in a city is a method
of communication that carries as an inextricable and expected consequence substantial littering of the streets, which the city has an
obligation to keep clean. It is also a method of communication of
some annoyance to a majority of people so addressed; that its impact
on its audience is very high is doubtful. Yet the constitutional balance in Schneider was struck emphatically in favor of keeping the
public forum open for this mode of communication.
Two years later Mr. Justice Roberts etched in his point still more
firmly in Valentine v. Chrestensen.7 Once again there was an ordinance prohibiting discrimination of handbills and circulars. The
one distinguishing feature of this ordinance was its limitation to
commercial and advertising matter. The defendant was the owner
of a former United States submarine that he sought to exhibit for
profit. Accordingly he prepared handbills advertising the ship and
soliciting visitors for a stated admission fee. Advised by the police
that only handbills on public issues would be lawful, the defendant
resourcefully attempted to alchemize his leaflet into a message of
social significance by printing a protest against the police and the
ordinance on one side and his advertisement on the other. He then
proceeded to distribute his double-edged leaflet. Threatened further
by police displeasure, he brought suit to enjoin the police from
interfering with his distribution. He won in the lower courts, but
the Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision, and in so
doing added meaurably to the point made by Schneider and the
Hague dictum.
Mr. Justice Roberts began with a sturdy reaffirmation of the
dictum: 8
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating in66

"And yet, much as I like this broad language, there is something about the
handbill and phonograph cases that makes me uncomfortable. The limitations they
impose on governmental control of street distributions and solicitations look a bit
fragile in a rough and tumble world. I wonder whether they can last." CHALru,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 405.
67 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
68 Id. at 54.
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formation and disseminating opinion and that though the
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.
He then made short shrift of the distributor's claim. The stratagem
was transparent; this was still advertising matter. The issue is a
different one where distribution of commercial advertising is at
stake. Here the judgment of the legislature concerning the appropriate accommodation of interests is final. 9 There was clear recog70
nition of the principle of public use that was urged in Schneider:
"The question is not whether the legislative body may interfere
with the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must
permit such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable invasion of,
or interference with, the full and free use of the highways by the
people in fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated."
It is now apparent that what was involved in Schneider was imperfectly characterized as freedom from arbitrariness in the state's
control of public places, for that, after all, was the measure of the
commercial distributor's claim. What was involved was reasonable
regulation of the immemorial claim of the free man to use the
streets as a forum. The regulation in order to be deemed reasonable,
the Court was telling us, must recognize the special nature and value
of that claim to be on the street.
The pattern was developed slightly by Jamison v. Texas 71 in the
following year. Again we had a Jehovah's Witness charged with
violation of a municipal ordinance forbidding the distribution of
leaflets on the streets. In a unanimous decision the Court reversed
the conviction. For the most part the issues were repetitions of
those already decided. The city once again argued for plenary
power, citing Davis, and was told by Mr. Justice Black that the
argument had been "directly rejected by this Court."72 The one
09 Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), drawing again the sharp distinction between commercial and political or religious use of the streets. For discussion of the underlying principle involved, see Meildejohn, The Priority of the
Market Place of Ideas; Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place; and
Freund, Competing Freedoms in American Constitutional Law, UNWsITY oF
CHICAGO LAv ScHooL, CoNFERENCE ON FREEDOM AND THE LAW 3, 16, 26 (1953).
70 316 U.S. at 54-55.

71318 U.S. 413 (1943).

72Id.

at 416.
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new point was that the city was unsuccessful in its effort to bring
the case within Valentine on the ground that the activity was
commercial, because the Witnesses solicited contributions in the
course of their distribution. The Court thus indicated that it had
a realistic functional distinction in mind when it so sharply separated commercial from noncommercial speech.
The handbill sequence may be brought to a close for my purposes with consideration of Talley v. California,73 a 1960 decision
related only obliquely to the previous cases. It represents, however,
the high-water mark of the Court's protection of speech by handbill. The case is set apart by the fact that the ordinance banned,
not all handbills, but only those that did not carry the name and
address of the author, printer, and sponsor. It is a key precedent,
therefore, for problems of compulsory disclosure. 74 The defendants
were arrested for distributing handbills, without the required identification, urging boycotts of certain merchants for discriminating
in employment against "Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals."
The Court upset the convictions, but this time there was disagreement within the ranks. Mr. Justice Harlan filed a separate concurrence 75 and there were dissents from Justices Clark, Whittaker,
and Frankfurter. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black framed
the issue in a curious manner. The ban on leaflet distribution, we
were told, fell under the rulings in Schneider and Jamison, "unless
the ordinance is saved by the qualification that handbills can be
distributed 'if they carry the appropriate identification."' In an
interesting and important passage, the Court then analyzed the virtues of anonymity in the fight for freedom, and concluded that
the qualification did not save the ordinance. Nor was the state's
interest in preventing fraud sufficiently related to the identification
requirement to justify the ordinance.
At the very least the decision can be read as saying that leaflet
distribution cannot be barred except for very good reasons and that
anonymity of the leaflets is not a good enough reason, whatever its
connection with preventing fraud. More generously, the case can
73 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
74 See KALvEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 120-21.

75 Mr. Justice Harlan placed his decision squarely on the state's failure to show a
rational connection between the objective of preventing fraud and the means used.
362 U.S. at 66.
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be read as treating the distribution of leaflets in the public forum
as so basic a right that it cannot be burdened with even the modest
sanction of compulsory disclosure of sponsorship.
Although there are some differences between a lone distributor of
leaflets on a city street and two thousand pickets at a courthouse,
the leaflet cases furnish the relevant model for analysis of the complex speech issues involved.7 6 The operative theory of the Court,
at least for the leaflet situation, is that, although it is a method of
communication that interferes with the public use of the streets,
the right to the streets as a public forum is such that leaflet distribution cannot be prohibited and can be regulated only for weighty
reasons. And the distinctive First Amendment underpinning for this
protection is reflected in the fact that the privilege does not apply
to commercial leaflets.

IV. Cox REvisITED
The above theory is clearly not that with which the Court
approached its problem in Cox. Mr. Justice Goldberg, after citing
70 The sound-truck cases deserve a special word since the sound truck rather
than the leaflet might be thought to provide the relevant analogy for protest speech.
The analogy is spoiled, however, by the peculiar history of the issue in the Court.
The initial case, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), although it speaks of
"loud speakers as today indispensable instruments of effective public speech," id. at
561, decides no more than that the prior licensing scheme involved was bad because of the unfettered discretion of the public official, a familiar point not involving any distinctive evaluation of the sound truck.
The second sound-truck case, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), has at times
been loosely read as a reversal of the protection given in Saia. The 5 to 4 decision
is difficult to scan for several reasons. The five-man majority produced three separate and different opinions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion,
elected this as the occasion for a major opinion attacking any "preferred position"
principle. Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion read the result as "a repudiation" of Saia. Further, the ordinance in question was ambiguous on whether
it banned all sound trucks or only "loud and raucous" ones. The angry dissenters
read the decision as sweepingly as possible to intensify their dissents. Mr. Justice
Rutledge appropriately complained of "such a hashing of different views of the
thing forbidden." Id. at 105. But if the four dissenters in Kovacs (Black, Douglas,
Rutledge, and Murphy) are taken with the majority other than Frankfurter and
Jackson (Burton, Reed, Vinson), we have seven Justices who certainly did not decide that all sound trucks could be banned.
The sound truck may invite the question whether a form of speech, a sound
truck or a parade, might not be so collaterally disruptive as to make total barring
of it appropriate, regardless of time, place, or circumstance. I think the answer is
no, so long as we are talking of behavior intended as communication. Cf. Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); see note 88 infra on the captive-audience aspects of
protest speech.
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all the relevant cases, concluded: 77 "The rights of free speech and
assembly, while fundamental in democratic society, still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address
a group at any public place and at any time." The "falling off," to
use Hamlet's phrase, between this dictum and that of Mr. Justice
Roberts in Hague is not to be explained on the ground that the
Court had forgotten, or even that it would like to forget, the Roberts
theory, but rather that it sees great differences between leaflets,
which are "speech pure," and parades, pickets, and protest, which
are "speech plus."
Mr. Justice Goldberg made this point explicit:"' "We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who
would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching,
and picketing on streets and highways as these amendments afford
to those who communicate by pure speech." Mr. Justice Black was
equally emphatic:79 "The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I
think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to
restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly 'where people have a
right to be for such purposes. This does not mean, however, that
these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in conduct of picketing or patrolling whether on publicly owned streets
or privately owned property." And at an earlier point in his opinion
Black spoke of the state regulating patrolling and marching as distinguished from "speech." (The emphasis was his.)
It is now clear how the Court wished to conceptualize its problem. There are two kinds of communication activity-"speech pure"
and "speech plus." Out of respect for precedent, the Court will be
generous to "speech pure" in public places, but this does not apply
to the cases at hand involving "speech plus." Hence, if there were
a concept of the streets as a public forum, it does not protect
"speech plus." Mr. Justice Black was willing to say outright that
there is no constitutional bar to the flat prohibition of "speech plus"
U.S. at 554.
Id. at 555. See also id. at 563: "The examples are many of the applications by
this court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be
regulated or prohibited."
791d. at 578. (Emphasis in original.) See also id. at 581: "Standing, patrolling, or
marching back and forth on streets is conduct not speech, and as conduct can be
regulated and prohibited."
77 379
78
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in the streets. Mr. Justice Goldberg was unwilling to decide that
issue, although he was quite willing to raise it gratuitously.
A. SPEECH PURE AND SPEECH PLUS

The Court's neat dichotomy of "speech pure" and "speech plus"
will not work. For it leaves us without an intelligible rationale. For
one thing the exercise of constitutional rights in their "most pristine
and classic form" in Edwards has become an exercise in "speech
plus." For another the Court seems to have forgotten Valentine.
What in this scheme is commercial speech? Or is there now a threelevel theory of speech 0 in public places: "speech pure," "speech
plus," and "speech commercial," each with its appropriate degree
of regulation?
To begin with, I would suggest that all speech is necessarily
"speech plus." If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt someone
else; if it is written, it may be litter. Indeed this is why the leaflet
cases were an appropriate model: they involved speech with collateral consequences that invited regulation. But the leaflets were not
simply litter; they were litter with ideas.
Perhaps this is the time to bring into the discussion a classic distinction in speech theory. It is the distinction between regulations
like Robert's Rules of Order and regulation of content. No one
has ever argued that speech should be free of the restraints of reasonable parliamentary rules, and any concessions on this front
should not be taken as relevant to the questions most central to
speech theory-questions of control of content. The point then is
that, in any theory, speech has always been dependent on some
commitment to order and etiquette. There is, therefore, nothing
novel in the vulnerability of protest speech to regulation on this
score. This is not, as the Court was willing to assume in Cox, a
characteristic setting it apart from traditional speech and hence
summarily subject to regulation.
Listen for a moment to Alexander Meildejohn describing a town
meeting: 81
In the town meeting the people of a community assemble
to discuss and to act upon matters of public interest-roads,
80

Some commentators have discovered a two-level theory at work in the obscenity cases. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, [1960] SuFmREACoUmr RLvmw 1.
81Ma igza*jom¢, op. cit. supra note 36, at 24-28.
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schools, poorhouses, health, external defense, and the like.
Every man is free to come. They meet as political equals.
Each has a right and a duty to think his own thoughts, to express them, and to listen to the arguments of others. The
basic principle is that the freedom of speech shall be unabridged. And yet the meeting cannot even be opened unless, by common consent, speech is abridged. A chairman or
moderator is, or has been, chosen. He "calls the meeting to
order." And the hush which follows that call is a clear indication that restrictions upon speech have been set up. The
moderator assumes, or arranges, that in the conduct of the
business, certain rules of order will be observed. Except
as he is overruled by the meeting as a whole, he will enforce
those rules. His business on its negative side is to abridge
speech. For example, it is usually agreed that no one shall
speak unless "recognized by the chair." Also, debaters must
confine their remarks to "the question before the house."
If one man "has the floor," no one else may interrupt him
except as provided by the rules. The meeting has assembled,
not primarily to talk, but primarily by means of talking to
get business done. And the talking must be regulated and
abridged as the doing of the business under actual conditions
may require. If a speaker wanders from the point at issue,
if he is abusive or in other ways threatens to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be and should be declared "out
of order." He must then stop speaking, at least in that way.
And if he persists in breaking the rules, he may be "denied
the floor" or, in the last resort, "thrown out" of the meeting.
The town meeting, as it seeks for freedom of public discussion of public problems, would be wholly ineffectual unless
speech were thus abridged....
These speech-abridging activities of the town meeting indicate what the First Amendment to the Constitution does
not forbid. When self-governing men demand freedom of
speech they are not saying that every individual has an inalienable right to speak whenever, wherever, however he
chooses. They do not declare that any man may talk as he
pleases, when he pleases, about what he pleases, about whom
he pleases, to whom he pleases. The common sense of any
reasonable society would deny the existence of that unqualified right. No one, for example, may, without consent of
nurse, or doctor, rise up in a sickroom to argue for his principles or his candidate. In the sickroom, that question is
not "before the house." The discussion is, therefore, "out
of order." To you who now listen to my words, it is allowable
to differ with me, but it is not allowable for you to state
that difference in words until I have finished my reading.
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Anyone who would thus irresponsibly interrupt the activities
of a lecture, a hospital, a concert hall, a church, a machine
shop, a classroom, a football field, or a home, does not thereby
exhibit his freedom. Rather, he shows himself to be a boor,
a public nuisance, who must be abated, by force if necessary.
The Meildejohn passage demonstrates that there is something
askew in the distinction between "speech pure" and "speech plus."
Certainly his recalcitrant participant at the town meeting is engaged
in "speech plus"; but if he is, who is not? And surely it is sobering
to note that the call for regulation of such activity on behalf of the
rational use of speech resources comes from the champion of the
position that the First Amendment is an abolute.8 2
B. COX V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

The Supreme Court has one great precedent on the issue, Cox v.
New Hampshire,3 another Jehovah's Witness legacy. The city of
Manchester had an ordinance requiring a permit for any "theatrical
or dramatic representation ... parade or procession upon any public
street or way." The defendants were convicted of parading without
a permit. The case come to the same Court that had just decided
Hague and Schneider, with the exception that Justice Murphy had
replaced Justice Butler. In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed
the convictions. As in the distinction between Schneider and Valentine, the Court once again had a firm principle in hand. The case
had come to it with the great advantage of a strong construction
of the ordinance by the New Hampshire Supreme Court."4 It was,
therefore, established that discretion in granting permits was limited exclusively to considerations of time, place, and manner, and
in effect to the unbeatable proposition that you cannot have two
parades on the same corner at the same time.
Chief Justice Hughes began by restating the Hague-Schneider
formula: 5 "As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and
s2 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, [1961]
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viEw 245.
83 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
8491 N.H. 137, 148 (1940): "A license to permit its enjoyment may not be required as a form of censorship, but a license to permit its enjoyment in fair adjustment with the enjoyment of other relations and conditions is not understood to be
under the ban of the federal constitution."

85 312 U.S. at 574.
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processions is a traditional exercise of control by local government,
the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted
so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly
and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the
discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort
to public places." The Court noted that the New Hampshire arrangement had the "obvious advantage," not merely of avoiding
overlapping parades, but also of giving the public authorities notice
in advance so "as to afford opportunity for proper policing."8' 6 And
the state court was pellucidly clear that the licensing officials had
only the most limited authority under the ordinance. "The defendants, said the court, 'had a right under the Act to a license to march
when, where, and as they did, if after a required investigation it was
found that the convenience of the public in the use of the streets
would not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such changes in conditions or changes in time, place, and manner as would avoid disturbance.' "87 All that the ordinance required was that the parade
not be, in Mr. Meiklejohn's phrase, "out of order."
Of course, Cox v. New Hampshire did no more than to give a
general standard for accommodation of the conflicting interests. It
did not tell whether certain congested areas or certain times of the
day might not always be held unavailable for parading, nor whether
the size of some crowds might always be too large. But it seems to
me to symbolize the ideal of Robert's Rules of Order for use of the
public forum of the streets.
Admittedly there is a difference between the town meeting and
the street. In the former the only problems of order and competing
use relate to speakers, and the problem can be solved under a formula seeking to provide the maximum opportunity for speech at the
meeting. The streets on the other hand, although a meeting place
for free men from time out of mind, are also dedicated to other
uses, such as travel. Hence, the speech interests compete in this
instance with non-speech interests and the appropriate accommodation is more difficult. s8 Despite this difference it strikes me that
86 Id.at 576.
88

87

Ibid.

On Mr. Justice Black's view there is an additional complication. "Were the
law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes, and anywhere else could be
compelled to listen against their wish to speakers they did not want to hear." 379
U.S. at 578. The implications for free-speech theory of the concept of the captive
audience are profound. See KALvEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 156-60. It is not easy to
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Robert's Rules are a happy analogy because they make it so clear
that the concern ought not to be with censorship, or with the content of what is said; what is needed is a phasing or timing of the
activity, not a ban on it. It remains to be seen, of course, whether
even under this generous view, the protest movement may not
generate sharp controversies by asking for "prime time." But so long
as the intention is not obstruction or harassment, as in general it
has not been in the past demonstrations, it should be possible, if
difficult, to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements.
Thus, Mr. Justice Roberts really had it all worked out in
Schneider. Since all speech was "speech plus," it was subject to
regulation of time, place, manner, and circumstance, but to be
acceptable the regulation had to weigh heavily the fact that communication was involved. It is not clear to me why that formula
was not the appropriate one for evaluating the protest conduct in
Edwards. And, finally, to take the last step, why it was not also a
good formula to be applied to the conduct in Cox."9
C. ECCE! TWO HOBGOBLINS: BALANCING AND PRIOR RESTRAINTS

The Schneider rationale may, however, seem to have unwanted
overtones for free-speech enthusiasts. Does it not embrace two hobgoblins, a balancing test of First-Amendment interests, and a commitment to prior restraints by licensing?
It is, of course, clear that a formula calling for the weighing of
speech interests in the public forum against interests in the other
uses of public places requires that the Court engage in balancing.
see, however, why they bother Mr. Justice Black so much more here than did the
leaflets in Schneider, the street-corner speech in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951), the sound truck in Saia or Kovacs, or the door-bell ringing in Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
89 Arguably, the anti-picketing statute involved in Cameron v. Johnson, supra
note 12, will ultimately provide the test of the thesis. The statute prohibited picketing which interfered with ingress or egress into public buildings or obstructed the
free use of public streets and ways "contiguous thereto." It was thus substantially
more limited than the obstruction statute in Cox. The Court did not pass on the
merits but remanded the case on procedural grounds and is almost certain to have
to confront it again. Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, made even sharper his position
that there was no constitutional bar to banning such activity from the streets altogether and that, a fortiori, the Mississippi statute was not unconstitutional on its
face. He said, among other things, 'Every person who has the slightest information
about what is going on in this country can understand the importance of these issues." 381 U.S. at 742.
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Perhaps it is but another indication of how fruitless the controversy
over balancing has been and of how awkward for many speech
problems the clear-and-present-danger test has proved.90 Here the
balancing test comes down to us with the Schneider mandate that
the thumb of the Court be on the speech side of the scales, and
there is the further reminder, if one is needed, from Valentine that
this is not pure, or "mere," substantive due process with full deference to legislative judgment. Finally, the matter should be put to
rest by the fact, never more conspicuous than in his opinion in
Cox,9 that this is the one kind of speech case in which Mr. Justice
Black has always been willing to balance.
The judgments of time, place, and manner required must be so
linked to the factual situation as to make detailed legislative regulation a clumsy, inflexible device. The result is that the citizen may
need a license to use the public forum. It is true that prior licensing
has come down to us bearing some historical stigma. And, as we all
know, it was once thought with Blackstone that the chief meaning
of freedom of speech was simply absence of prior restraints. 2 Indeed, the first of the series of public forum cases, Lovell v. Griffin 3
in 1937, invalidated an ordinance requiring a permit for the distribution of circulars of any kind, because it was construed to apply
to all kinds of literature and all methods of distribution anywhere
in the city, without any limiting criteria for licensor discretion.
The Court, after calling on John Milton, said:9 4 "Legislation of the
type of this ordinance in question would restore the system of
license and censorship in its baldest form."
But there is little, if anything, left today to the idea that prior
licensing is bad per se, regardless of the criteria used. 5 It now appears that the historical reaction was against general licensing with
90 See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate bet'ween Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 LAW IN TR.ANs. 155, 173-79 (1961);

KALvEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 120-21.
91 "This Court does, and I agree that it should, 'weigh the circumstances' in order
to protect, not to destroy, freedom of speech, press, and religion." 379 U.S. at 578.
92 The relevant history of ideas is traced in Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931).
93 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

94 Id. at 452.
95

Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CoNt. PROB. 648 (1955);

Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4

VAND.

L. REv. 533 (1951).
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unlimited or unspecified grounds for exercise of discretion.96 The
recent Times Film case 97 has definitively put to rest any question
whether all prior restraints are necessarily bad." And, in any event,
Cox v. New Hampshire stands as a strong and healthy precedent
for use of a prior restraint, at least in regulating the public forum.
D. EQUAL PROTECTION AND CENSORSHIP

The rise of the Equal Protection Clause as a major weapon for
the current Court has been the subject of comment. 99 It will be
recalled that Justices Clark and Black made use of it in Cox as their
ground for upsetting the convictions for obstructing public passageways. It is likely to provide a second line of defense for vigorous
users of the public forum. If some groups are exempted from a
prohibition on parades and pickets, the rationale for regulation is
fatally impeached. The objection can then no longer be keyed to
interferences with other uses of the public places, but would appear
to implicate the kind of message that the groups were transmitting.
The regulation would thus slip from the neutrality of time, place,
and circumstance into a concern about content. The result is that
equal-protection analysis in the area of speech issues would merge
with considerations of censorship. And this is precisely what Mr.
Justice Black argued in Cox:' 00
But by specifically permitting picketing for the publication
of labor union views, Louisiana is attempting to pick and
choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on its
streets. It is thus trying to prescribe by law what matters of
public interest people it allows to assemble on its streets may
and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a
most odious form....
90 The definitive discussion is found in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951),
and Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). See also A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
9
7 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
0s There has not been time as yet to digest all the implications of Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), upsetting a Maryland movie censorship scheme because of the absence of procedural safeguards insuring prompt final determination.
The opinion revives talk of the "heavy presumption' against prior restraints. Id. at
57.
00
Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Goverrnment," 78 HAuv. L. REv. 143 (1964).
10Q 379 U.S. at 581.
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The point should have considerable practical significance. Everyone at some time or other loves a parade whatever its effect on
traffic and other uses of public streets. Municipalities pressed by
concern with the protest movement may be inhibited in any rush
to flat nondiscriminatory prohibitions by the difficulty of distinguishing between the parades we like and others. Equal protection
may, therefore, require freedom for the parades we hate.
In the Jehovah's Witness cases, the Court has been outspokenly
sensitive "to the poor man's printing press"''1 1 theme. Labor picketing apart, perhaps, the parade, the picket, the leaflet, the sound
truck, have been the media of communication exploited by those
with little access to the more genteel means of communication. We
would do well to avoid the occasion for any new epigrams about
the majestic equality of the law prohibiting the rich man, too, from
distributing leaflets or picketing.
What this consideration implies, I suggest, is not that the Negro,
because he lacks control of television, radio, newspapers, and national magazines, be allowed compensating privileges to irritate on
the streets, but rather that his unusual means of communication be
recognized as robust and amateur means of communication and not
be too quickly read as tactics of obstruction and harassment.
V. THE PICKET,THE COURTHOUSE, AND THE NARRow STATUTE
The one clear point that emerges with the force of precedent from the mixture of views in Cox is that you cannot picket the
courthouse. I have no particular enthusiasm for picketing courthouses as a form of protest nor do I think the issue is likely to be
one of practical importance. But it is worth pausing for a moment
to see, by way of conclusion, what the rule that you cannot picket
the courthouse adds to the notions of the public forum we have
been pursuing.
The Cox ruling bristles with perplexities, noted but not fully
resolved in the opinions. Would this same protest, the obstruction
issue aside, have been permissible if moved a few blocks away?
Could one, for example, distribute leaflets highly critical of the
court near the courthouse? Is there pressure and intimidation in the
protest in front of the courthouse that ceases to be present when
it is in front of the state house? Or is the principle that it is all right
101 E.g., Mr. Justice Black, in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. at 146: "Door to door
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."
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to intimidate legislatures but not courts?-0 2 Isthe vice in the picketing not so much in the time, place, and manner as in the message
addressed to the court, and, if this is the vice, how can the result
be squared with the insistent line of precedents on contempt by
publication?' 03 And, is it that in the courthouse situation the Court
finally perceives the reality behind the gesture, so that Cox is a
harbinger of increasingly stringent restrictions on protests? Or is
the point the precise opposite, that only the special sensitivity of
the law to the decorum of court proceedings makes the conduct
bad? Few if any other places can claim such special protection.
Hence, Cox may be the exception that will prove the rule of freedom.
Mr. Justice Goldberg made a most elaborate effort to deal with
these points, but the unpersuasiveness of several of his reasons, given
the other commitments the Court appears to have, is striking. "Mob
law," we are told, "is
the very antithesis of due process."' 1 4 And so
it is, but again there is the shadow of Edwards. What about "mob
law" and the legislature? Again we are told that a state may protect
"its judicial process from being misjudged in the minds of the public."'10 If the judge, however staunch and independent, happens
to decide in favor of the protest side, is there not a risk that the
public will misunderstand and think he yielded to pressure? But if
this is a valid point, does it not apply equally to editorials and telegrams from labor leaders? 10 6 And, again, when confronted with the
clear-and-present-danger formula, which still thrives in the contempt by publication cases, Mr. Justice Goldberg manfully said
that if the formula is to be the test for such speech then "crowds,
such as this, demonstrating before a courthouse . . . inherently

threaten the judicial process,"' 107 although the editorial and the
telegram do not.
102 Perhaps this is just one more sign of the conventional view of the permissible non-rationality of the legislative as contrasted to the judicial process. Mr. Justice Goldberg is careful to say that different considerations would apply if the demonstrators were "picketing to protest the actions of a mayor or other official of a
city completely unrelated to any judicial proceedings, who just happened to have
an office located in the courthouse building." 379 U.S. at 567.
103 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962).
104 See note 24 supra.
106 See note 103 supra.
105 379 US. at 565.
107 379 U.S. at 566.
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One cannot entirely escape a feeling that Mr. Justice Goldberg
had forgotten the facts about the demonstration he himself had
summarized. Although the group was enormous in size and did very
pointedly march up to the sidewalk opposite the courthouse, the
demonstration meeting appears to have paid little attention thereafter to the judicial process. The picket signs protested discrimination in the stores, the group sang anthems and hymns, while the
jailed students joined in responsive singing. The defendant, in his
speech to the group, simply said that the arrests were illegal because
other people were allowed to picket and then urged them to go forth
and sit in at lunch counters.
These are genuine difficulties in the Cox opinions, but the rationality and circumspection of the result is saved by one further circumstance on which the Court explicitly placed some stress. The circumstance is that the Court had the benefit of a narrow, precise state
statute representing a legislative judgment that in this one limited
area picketing is improper. The result would have been different
had the state courts in the absence of the statute proceeded to treat
the picketing as contempt. The point is not simply that a precise
statute avoids vagueness 08 or reduces the chances of unequal administration or even that by leaving other places and times available
it presents the Court with only a modest restriction. It is rather that,
in the difficult balancing process these cases force upon the Court,
it has the benefit of the counsel of a deliberate, specific, and relevant
legislative judgment.109 This is all, in the end, that the flaming commandment against picketing the courthouse in Cox should forebode
for regulation in other cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

Cox v. Louisiana is not one of the Court's more impressive
performances. The Court has among its precedents a fine tradition
about the public forum on which it did not sufficiently rely. Rather
is displayed irritation and anxiety in confronting one of the most
difficult practical issues of the moment. Among the many hallmarks
of an open society, surely one must be that not every group of
people on the streets is "a mob," and another that "its streets time
out of mind have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
108 This seems to be Mr. Justice Black's view of the point.
109 Cf. Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311
(1940).

